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Article text:  
 
Monetary union can take many years to be sustainable and successful, and the euro 
is no different, writes Angus Armstrong. He argues that, should the Eurozone 
proceed with plans for greater political and fiscal union, the UK may encounter a 
stronger EU in its renegotiation than otherwise foreseen. 
 
Events unfolding in the Eurozone matter for the UK’s referendum. The euro is the 
main currency of the EU: only two of the twenty-eight member nations have official 
opt-out clauses from joining the single currency (the UK and Denmark). What 
happens to the euro cannot be separated from the EU, and therefore the choice 
facing the UK electorate. 
 
There has been much ink spilt over the grand observation that the European Central 
Bank, by capping the emergency support to the Greek banking system, has shown 
that the euro is not an irrevocable currency among all member nations after all. 
This is true, and it may be that Greece exits from the single currency system. 
 
A popular school of thought is that the crisis exposes the Eurozone’s well known 
fault-lines to market forces. Put simply, without political union (a pre-requisite for 
fiscal union) the project is destined to fail. Events in Greece, whatever the outcome, 
make the Eurozone more vulnerable, which weakens the resolve of Eurozone leaders 
and strengthens the UK Government’s hand. 
 
But there is another plausible outcome. To steal from Mark Twain, reports of the 
demise of the euro are greatly exaggerated. It is less than a year ago that Scottish 
voters narrowly avoided leaving the oldest and most successful monetary union. 
 
Even in the US, eighty years after Congress was given monopoly power to issue the 
dollar, nine states went bankrupt and three separate currencies were circulating two 
decades later. It took the US one and a half centuries to achieve currency and 
financial union. The EU is attempting to do this in sixteen years. 
 
Everyone must see that Greece needs substantial debt relief. Ever since the first 
package over five years ago, the Troika’s and creditors’ ‘nickel and dime’ approach 
to returning to solvency has been unconvincing. 
 
The only rational argument for the creditors’ trenchant response is the cost of being 
seen as ‘lenient’, and giving substantial debt relief when agreed reforms are 
incomplete, will lead to requests from others nations for similar treatment in 
future. 
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Is there any evidence that this is tough love rather than bloody-mindedness? 
 
In response to the crisis, the European Commission has laid out impressively clear 
plans towards ‘full banking, economic, fiscal and political union’ in its Blueprint for 
a Deep and Genuine EMU. Of course talk is cheap but the creation of the European 
Banking Union already crosses the Rubicon of pooling fiscal resources of Eurozone 
member states. 
 
There is also an alternative possibility to the Eurozone countries becoming more 
vulnerable if Greece leaves the euro.  If the EU can really deliver its blueprint, this 
would surely make the system stronger. And member states are less likely to run 
excessive deficits if they know they face such harsh costs. 
 
It is in the UK’s interests to see a strong and vibrant EU, including Greece. If this is 
to be achieved, Eurozone countries must deliver on their own reform agenda. If this 
is achieved, the UK may find itself negotiating not with an EU willing to acquiesce, 
but an EU with a stronger Eurozone core with greater sharing of sovereignty. 
 
This article was originally published on the UK in a Changing Europe Blog. 
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